On this page
A pension fund should consider direct private-market investment when it has a credible advantage in sourcing and managing assets, enough scale to support a skilled team, and governance that can oversee that team. Lower external fees alone do not settle the decision: direct ownership transfers underwriting, concentration and operational responsibilities onto the fund. For a CAIA® Level II candidate, the useful answer is conditional: compare a conventional fund commitment, a co-investment alongside a manager and a fully self-directed investment against the pension’s capabilities and obligations.
Define the decision before comparing fees
A commitment to a private fund delegates most deal selection and execution to a general partner. The pension, as a limited partner, still needs manager due diligence, portfolio construction and monitoring, but it does not normally originate each underlying asset. A co-investment gives the pension exposure to a particular deal alongside a manager. It can decline the opportunity, yet it must assess it quickly and understand the manager’s incentives. A solo direct investment puts the pension in charge of sourcing, negotiating, ownership oversight and eventual disposal, perhaps with specialist advisers or operating partners.
These categories describe who makes decisions, not simply where a holding appears in a portfolio report. A pension may hold a stake through a company or special-purpose vehicle and still rely heavily on an external manager. Conversely, it may have an internal team working with a partner on a particular transaction. The exam question is likely to turn on control, cost and responsibility. CAIA Association’s discussion of asset-owner tools distinguishes partner-led co-investments from investments the asset owner originates and structures itself.
The attraction: control and a different cost structure
Direct investing can remove some external management and performance fees, permit closer alignment with a pension’s long horizon and provide more control over holding period or operating choices. Those benefits depend on the particular deal and the institution’s execution. Fees do not disappear: internal investment staff, legal advice, transaction work, risk systems and ongoing asset management are real costs. A fund that reports a lower external fee bill while ignoring those expenses has not shown a lower total cost of ownership.
Control also carries an opportunity to build specialised knowledge. An internal infrastructure team that understands a type of asset may negotiate more effectively and monitor operating risks directly. But specialised knowledge takes time to acquire and can be lost when key people leave. A board needs to ask whether the institution can keep a disciplined process through staff turnover and market cycles. If the supposed advantage is only that a manager offered a deal, the pension may not have an independent sourcing edge at all.
A worked make-or-buy screen
Consider an invented pension evaluating an illustrative private-assets sleeve of 600 million currency units. It estimates that an external fund route would cost 1.5% of the sleeve annually in relevant investment and management costs, while a direct programme would incur 0.5% in transaction-linked and variable costs plus a fixed internal team cost of 4 million currency units annually. These are teaching assumptions, not observed pension data or market fee benchmarks. On this narrow cost screen, the external route costs 9 million, while the direct route costs 3 million plus 4 million, or 7 million. The indicated annual saving is 2 million.
That calculation is a starting point, not an approval memo. If the internal team cost is understated by 2 million, the apparent advantage vanishes. If the direct programme can place only part of the sleeve in suitable deals, applying its fee advantage to the entire 600 million would overstate savings. If a large direct holding fails, its loss could dominate many years of fees saved. The committee should stress-test deployment, acquisition costs, follow-on capital and exit assumptions before concluding that the lower expense estimate creates value.
A useful break-even calculation asks how much capital the team would need to oversee before savings on external fees cover fixed internal cost. In the invented case, the gap between the external route and the direct variable-cost rate is one percentage point; a 4 million fixed team cost therefore requires 400 million of deployed capital to break even on these stated costs. This is arithmetic, not a universal threshold. Change the fee difference, team cost or deployment rate and the answer changes. Risk, governance and opportunity quality remain outside that equation.
Why governance can overturn a favourable calculation
A directly invested pension operates more like an investment firm than a passive purchaser of fund interests. It needs authority boundaries between deal teams, risk oversight and the board. Investment staff must be able to decline attractive-looking deals that breach concentration limits or rely on optimistic operating assumptions. The board must understand valuation methods for assets without frequent market prices and must examine conflicts when a partner, adviser or manager stands on both sides of a transaction.
The World Bank’s Canadian pension model report identifies independent governance, scale, in-house management, diversification and talent as linked characteristics of major Canadian public pension organisations. This is a description of institutional design, not a recipe that any pension can copy by hiring a deal team. An institution with limited autonomy or compensation flexibility may struggle to recruit and retain the specialists that a direct strategy requires. Equally, scale without clear accountability can magnify a poor decision.
The fund’s liabilities also matter. A long-duration liability base may support patient capital, but cash requirements for benefits and collateral can change. A private holding cannot always be sold quickly at an acceptable price. Before making a large direct commitment, the pension needs to examine its liquidity plan, expected capital calls, debt in the asset and the consequences of a delay in exits. A manager relationship does not remove these risks, but it changes who handles day-to-day execution and how exposure is diversified.
Where co-investment fits
Co-investment offers a middle route. The general partner usually originates the opportunity and may lead the transaction, while the pension decides whether to join on the offered terms. A lighter fee load may help, but it can be offset by concentrated exposures, a rushed review or poor alignment. The pension must check whether the deal sits within the manager’s normal strategy, why capacity is being shared, how information will be provided and how the joint owners will handle later funding needs.
CAIA Association’s co-investment research stresses implementation, resources, prompt decisions and monitoring. A limited partner that cannot review a transaction within the manager’s timetable may accept weak deals selectively or miss stronger ones. The analysis should include indirect exposure through existing fund commitments so that a co-investment does not unknowingly double the pension’s exposure to the same business, sector or economic risk.
Co-investment does not automatically teach a team to originate solo investments. Reviewing a partner’s prepared deal and building a proprietary pipeline are different tasks. A fund might use co-investments to develop underwriting discipline, but it should measure those transactions on their own merit and avoid assuming a path to a fully direct model. If internal expertise remains thin, a well-chosen external fund may be more defensible than a low-fee deal the pension cannot analyse independently.
A decision sequence for candidates
- Start with the pension’s objective, liabilities and liquidity needs. A deal attractive in isolation may be unsuitable for the whole fund.
- Specify the operating model: delegated fund commitment, partner-led co-investment or internally originated direct deal. Name who sources, underwrites, monitors and exits.
- Compare all-in costs, including internal salaries and transaction costs, on the capital actually expected to be deployed.
- Test governance: board independence, delegation limits, conflict controls, valuation challenge and succession of key staff.
- Test concentration and deal flow. Fee savings cannot rescue weak underwriting or a portfolio built from too few suitable assets.
The Omni CAIA programme page places this topic within alternative-investment study, while how it works gives the study format. The takeaway for an exam response is a conditional judgement: state what the pension gains, identify the capability it must pay for, and explain the constraint that could make an apparently cheaper route unsuitable. That is a different task from calculating a fee difference alone.
Sources
- A Quick Pour from Capital Decanted | CAIA Association · caia.org · Retrieved
- The Evolution of the Canadian Pension Model | World Bank · documents1.worldbank.org · Retrieved
- Cresting the Co-Investment Opportunity | CAIA Association · caia.org · Retrieved



