On this page
States cooperate when a shared arrangement advances their interests and each trusts the other to honour it. They compete when security, relative power or mistrust makes unilateral action more attractive, even if joint action could create economic gains. For CFA® Level I, identify the interest, the incentives and the likely channel to a business; do not label an entire country permanently cooperative or competitive.
Begin with the decision each state faces
Geopolitics asks how location, resources, power and international relationships shape political choices. A government may want cheaper imports, access to a market and stable payment flows. It may also want secure supply of an essential input, control of sensitive technology or protection from a military threat. These aims can coexist. The same government can support open trade in ordinary consumer goods while restricting a strategic component. The useful analytical unit is a particular decision and relationship, not a permanent personality assigned to a state.
CFA Institute's Introduction to Geopolitics places national interests and cooperation among its central ideas. It describes economic, military and cultural aims and notes that the relative importance of an interest matters. An analyst should therefore ask what the state is protecting, what it might gain from exchange, and whether the benefit is essential or merely convenient. A supply arrangement that saves money can be outweighed by a security concern if the imported item is difficult to replace.
Competition does not mean all exchange has stopped. A government may bargain firmly over access, subsidise domestic capacity or limit particular transactions while continuing trade elsewhere. Cooperation also does not mean interests have merged. Agreements exist partly because parties expect to disagree in future and want a predictable way to handle the disagreement. The spectrum is better read as the degree and scope of cooperation in a specific area than as a single score for a whole country.
Why joint gains can fail to produce an agreement
Consider two states that would both save on transport if they kept a shared shipping corridor open. Joint use is economically attractive. Yet each fears that the other could later exclude its vessels or use the corridor for security purposes. If neither can verify compliance, each may build a costly alternative route. Both then spend more than under the cooperative arrangement. This is the incentive problem behind a prisoner's dilemma: the individually defensive choice can leave both parties worse off.
A repeated relationship can change the calculation. When states expect to meet again, they have something to lose from breaking a bargain. Monitoring, transparent rules and credible remedies can also reduce uncertainty. These mechanisms do not remove all rivalry. They make the immediate gain from defecting smaller relative to the value of continued exchange. The IMF's discussion of trade cooperation amid geopolitical rivalry stresses that strategic rivals may still gain from negotiated arrangements; rivalry alone does not prove that cooperation is impossible.
Another distinction is between absolute and relative gains. If both economies gain from a trade arrangement, the gain is positive in absolute terms. A state may still reject it if it believes its rival gains a capability that could later be used against it. A candidate who says 'both gain, so both must agree' has omitted the strategic constraint. A candidate who says 'rivals never trade' has made the opposite error. The evidence required is the importance of the contested sector, the ability to monitor behaviour, and how benefits and security costs are distributed.
Work through an illustrative two-state choice
The following amounts are invented round numbers for explanation, not observed trade data. Country A and Country B each face a choice over a jointly maintained port facility. If both cooperate, reduced delays add 100 units of annual value to each economy after maintenance costs. If A refuses access while B cooperates, A gets 120 units from exclusive priority but B gets 20. Reverse the choices and the payoffs reverse. If both restrict access, each gets only 40 because duplicated facilities and delays consume the potential gain.
The table is deliberately simple: mutual cooperation gives a combined 200 units, while mutual restriction gives only 80. A government focused solely on combined value would prefer cooperation. But the unilateral 120-unit payoff and the fear of receiving only 20 make both sides attentive to the other side's likely move. The example does not establish that restriction is inevitable. It shows why a credible access and inspection agreement could change the decision. What matters is whether each side can rely on the arrangement when its rival has an incentive to depart from it.
Now suppose the port also hosts equipment with a security use. Even if the commercial arithmetic remains unchanged, the states may rank a secure position above a short-term 20-unit economic difference. The analyst should separate the shipping benefit from the security objective rather than forcing one label onto the whole dispute. The conclusion can be 'cooperation in routine cargo, competition over strategic access'. This qualified conclusion is more informative than predicting a complete opening or closure without evidence.
Translate the relationship into an exam answer
The first step is to name the actors and the specific action. The second is to identify what each actor gains from a joint arrangement and from acting alone. The third is to explain what may sustain or undermine the arrangement: repeated dealings, clear rules, verification, power asymmetry or a security constraint. Only then trace a possible business channel, such as delivery time, input cost, market access or financing conditions. This sequence keeps the answer causal. It avoids a vague claim that 'geopolitics raises risk' without saying whose cash flows could change.
A state can move towards less cooperation on one issue without becoming self-sufficient. Autarky means extreme withdrawal from external exchange; most selective restrictions do not meet that description. Likewise, bilateral cooperation between two states is not the same as broad multilateral cooperation. CFA Institute's framework distinguishes autarky, hegemony, multilateralism and bilateralism as patterns of behaviour. For this learning outcome, use those terms only when the facts warrant them. A customs agreement between two governments is a bilateral arrangement, even when both also participate in wider institutions.
A second common mistake is to confuse a tool with the underlying stance. A tariff, investment restriction or agreement is an instrument. Its interpretation depends on who is affected, how broad it is and why it was chosen. A separate discussion of geopolitical tools is useful once you have classified the incentive. For the assigned question, start with cooperation versus competition and use the instrument as evidence of that relationship.
The classification also needs a time horizon. A short negotiation breakdown may delay cargo for a quarter without ending a longer commercial relationship. A security restriction on a critical input could persist through several political cycles and prompt expensive replacement capacity. The analyst should not infer duration from the word competition alone. Ask whether the action has a sunset date, whether the affected firms can substitute inputs, and whether the states still have a channel for bargaining. Those conditions determine whether the main effect is a temporary cost, a lasting change in production, or uncertainty while a decision is pending.
Do not confuse an observed policy with a guaranteed market outcome. A threatened restriction may never be implemented, and a signed agreement may be interpreted differently by the parties. In an exam vignette, distinguish what has happened from what might happen. A careful statement might say that continued access would protect the fictional shipping benefit, while a verified closure would increase costs for exposed firms. That is a conditional explanation. It shows the route from state incentives to business operations without pretending that the framework supplies a probability or a trading instruction.
A practical way to revise the idea
Take a short fictional case and write two columns: potential shared gains and reasons for unilateral action. Then add a sentence stating what evidence would make cooperation more credible. For the port example, shared gains are lower shipping costs; unilateral incentives include exclusive access and security; useful evidence would include a binding operating agreement and observable enforcement. If the case changes from a port to a technology input, the reasoning remains the same while the facts in each column change.
Check your answer against the exact verb in the learning outcome. 'Describe' calls for a clear explanation of how states may engage and why their incentives differ; it does not require a confident forecast of a live dispute. The CFA program page gives broader programme context, while the content methodology explains how Omni sources and reviews its material. The exam skill here is to make a conditional, evidence-led classification rather than to repeat a headline about rivalry.
Sources
- Introduction to Geopolitics | CFA Institute · cfainstitute.org · Retrieved
- Trade Cooperation in an Age of Geopolitics | IMF · imf.org · Retrieved



